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ABSTRACT 
Based on recen t ,  continuing advanccs in  semiconductor 
technology, classical N-h4od1ilar Redundancy appears to bc a 
viablc approach for dcsigni~rg ultra-safc flight control systems 
in  the near future. 
RAM? co l~s i s t s  of clistributcd se ts  of parallel  computers 
partitioned on the basis of softwsrc and packaging constraints.  
To mininlizc hardwvarc and softwarc con~plcxity,  the  
processors  operate asynchronously. I t  is s h o w ~  that  through the 
design of asyn~ptotically stable control laws, data c r r o r s  ~ I I C  to  
W. R. Dunn is with tllc University of Southrrll Colol.ado, i n  
Pueblo, Coloratlo. 
the asynchronism can be minimized. It is further shown that 
by designing control laws with this property and making minor 
hardware modifications to the RAMP niodules, the systcrn 
becomes inherently tolerant to intermittent faults. 
A laboratory version of RAMP has been constructed and 
is described in the paper along with the experimental results 
obtained to date. 
I The authors a r c  currently cngaged in an avionics systcm a 
research progran seeking design mcthodologics for realizing 
future high authority autoflight control systcms. This effort i s  
broad in scope and includes control law dcvcl ,pmcnt, ctxperimcnta- 
I tion wit11 scilsors and actuators, and the invt?stigation of distri- 
1 buted microcon~pntcr architccturcs. The Iattcr , in particular 
the rc:dund'mt asynchronous n~ic roproc~sao t  (RAMP) structure 
is curl cntly being invc jtigatcd and is t31r subjcct of this paper. 
Bcforc describing RAMP i n  detail, i t  i s  t~scful to f irst  describe 
thc gcncral structlirc and tllc kcy clcmcnts that collc.cti~~cly 
makc it a new and diffcrcnt approach in itnplemcnting dip.ital 
avionics sys tcn~s .  This is donc in t11c following section. . 
X I .  RAMP - AN OVERVIEW 
Given the requircme~rt for increased aircraft operatioh. ai 
complexities by the 1990's (real time a i r  traffic control, fuel 
mininliza?50nD autolandD ctc.) i t  i p  clear that the digital computer 
will become the donlinant component in avionic8 systcms 
implcmcntations. This need for tllcse more con~plex operations 
i s  a t  first sight an invitation for more complcx avionics systexns. 
It has been the autl~ors'  core philosophy to research 
' 
c o n c e ~ t  s and nlcthodologics that m&rnizc digital avionics 
system sinlylicity b!thout ccmpronlisc of future operational 
rcquircn~cnts . 
Onc rcsult of such work is the compact Total Auton~atic 
Flight Control System ( TAFCOs) algorithm (dc scribcd in 
Rcfcrcnces 1 and 2) apylicablc to highly non-linear systcms. 
This sanlc thinking has lcd tllc authors to depart from 
thc convcntionrrl ( c .  6. data processing industry) approach of 
rn~ploying diqital systems in an avionics c:lvil\o~~l.ilcnt and to 
instcad invrstigstc> RRhW. Bcforc discussing thc cxtcnt of 
this dcparturc, i t  i s  useful to &*scribc thc overall approach 
being takcn as  follows. 
A8 seen in Figure 1, RAMP comprises a connected 
network of microcomputers which has as  input command and 
sensor information and which generates servo information to 
drive actuators, thrust linkages, etc. Each microcomputer 
in the network moreover performs a specific, well-defined 
input/output function such as sensor data conversion and 
prcprocessing, execution of flight control algorithms, scrvo- 
positioning, etc. Although consisting of digital syseem 
elements, the network i s  intentionally structured and operated 
as a conventional analog control system: sensor data a re  input 
and scrpo data are  output as  a function of command mode inputs. 
Correspondingly, the individual microcomputcrs "appear" 
as analog-like elements each having a prcdctermincd se t  of 
(command) sclectablc inputloutput characteristics. The micro- 
computers a t  each node are moreover autono~nous :
1) Each has i t s  own clock, i. e. , the network has no 
master or central timing rcfcrence uith the result 
that thc microcomputcrs in thc network a rc  not 
synchronized. 
2) The conlputers arc  clcctrically isolated to the 
extent that hardware failures do not propogatc 
from a given, failcd microcomputer. 
3)  Interconnect between microcomputerrr i r  confined to 
data traffic such tlat a given microcomputer simply 
ltbroadcaststt messages to one or more of the other 
tnicrocomputers in the nctwork, the received 
mes s ages being authomatically buffered and used by 
the receiving microcomputers. 
EYinally, to insure flight safety in the event of hardware 
failures, redundant microcomputers arc employed at each node 
as depicted in Figure 2 such that failures in a transmitting 
microcomputcr (or the associated data transmission path) will 
be recognized by a receiving microcomputer in that former's 
data will be disparate with that of the remaining "good" micro- 
computers. Hencc thc rccciving computer (which normally 
will also bc replicated) can select the correct data. 
Now this approach differs fro~n the conventional, data 
proccssing approach (c. g. References 3 and 4) to digital systems 
implcn3entation in scvcral rcspccts: 
1) Thc RAMP network and n~odulcs are structured 
to pe r fo~m a linlitcd rangc bf specific, analog-like 
iunctions; this is to be contrasted with the usc of 
a nctwork of general purpose computers. 
2)  The RAMP microcomputer moduler are autonomaur; 
the rystem does not employ an operating ryatam. 
global executive software or complex intormodule 
communicatione software. 
3) The modules are not synchronized: i.e.. central 
timing hardware and software are not employed. 
4) Finally, tolerance to hardware failures i s  
achieved by static redundancv (Reference 5). i. e. 
results of a failed microcomputer arc simply 
rejected; this is donc in lieu of dmamic redundancy 
(Reference 5) wherein the distributed computer 
system performs real time fault detection and re- 
configuration of the system. 
Thcsc foregoing differenc:es arc summarized in  the 
table which follows. 
TABLE 2-1: RAMP VERSUS CONVENTZONAL PGITAL SYSTEMS 
IMPLEmENTATiON 
RAMP -
Fixed function, 
Analog -like 
Implcmcntation 
e No operating system or 
Globr 1 Exccutivc . 
Limited module -to-module 
communication sdtware 
o Asynchronous 
e Static Redundancy 
e Low Complexity 
CONVENTIONAL 
General purpose 
Data processing 
~rnplemcntation 
e Centralized Operating 
System, Global Executive 
Software, Intermodule 
Communication 
Softwarc 
e Dynamic Rcdundancy- 
Requires Real T i n ~ c  
Fault I dcntification 
and Reconfiguration 
e High Conlpledty 
111. THE R A M P  NETWORK STRUCTURE AND OPERATlON 
The previous r ection hias deecribed the genar 81 architecture 
employed i n  RAMP. 
Figure 3 shows a specific network ntruchrre based cm 
the RAMP cor~cept which ir being invertigatod by the authors in 
the current flight research program. Arr shown, computers arc 
distributed into fivc sets of triplets (e.g. N = 3) .  
There are three reasons $or partitioning the computation 
given in their or.dcr of importance as followr: 
1) Figurc 3 shows that the systcm computation process 
divider into thrcc groups: scnsor /command pm ccsring, 
thc control algorithm and scrvo processing. In the 
airbornc application, each of thcsc groups would be 
expcctcd to physically reside in c'iffercnt parts of 
the aircraft systcm. (I. e. the partitioning into 
d i s t i y  c t  compl~tational sites is actually govcrncd by 
packaging and cabling constraints. ) 
2)  As will be discussed in more detail in Section V, 
the rcliancc on static redundancy for flight safcty 
prcsumc6 that each computer be fully self-tostcd 
before flight. The distributing of the computation 
load into several, smaller microcomputers facilitate5 
reasonably short yet comprehensive preflight tests.  
3 )  The final motivating factor in  distributing the comp- 
utation is that hardware boundaries can be set  on 
the system softv are. E. g. , aa depicted in Figure 3 
software i n  partitioncd into corrcspc~ding hardware 
module6 with tlrc result that softwarc can be con- 
currently developed and, more important, modificd 
without effecting the rcmaindcr of the softwarc in the 
rystcm. 
The network opcratcs in the following manner: 
f input data from r triply 1) Microcomputers in the se t  ,IdljJ 
redundant set of scnsars* and redundant (crcw 
gene rated) comn~ands, the latter consisting of 
trajectory waypoints and flight modes. The nlicro- 
comFutcrs process the scnscr data (corrcct  values 
bci ng sclcct c d  from the rcdunbnt inputs) and 
derive t*stimatcs of thc a i r c r a f t  s ta tcs .  Corrcs- 
pondi ngly, corrcct waypoi nt s and mode commands 
arc  srl  cct cd. (1%~ exact- mcchani cs of thi 6 
- 
* It is also possiblc in thi s t;+!-.- of application to cmploy an 
anal y t i c ~ l l y  r t - h d a n t  scbnsor mix as dcscri bed in Ref crt-nccs 
6 and 7. 
relect ion procer 8 a re  di ~ c u s s e d  in the next section. ) 
Each microcornput er  in the l e t  (M t rmamita 
results to a11  microcomputer^ in  the set  {'MZj) . 
2) A. ngted, each microcomputer i n  the aet JM . I  
L 21 
has the results  of computations made by all the micro- 
j. computers in the met L M  5 . From t h i s  set of 
lj 
inputr,  each microcomputer in aelccls t M z j l  
by voting, the correct statc cstimates, commar:d 
modcs and commandcd waypoi nta and coxnput cs the 
trajectory to be f lou~i  by the aircraft. Thcrc results 
are then transnlittcd to rnicrocornputers { M ~ ~ \  . 
3) This proccrs continues in a similar manner, micro- 
computers { ~ ~ ~ f  selecting results, computing the 
control (using the commandcd and actual traj cctory 
stales) and transmitting these to [ ~ ~ ~ f  and so  on. 
4) Thc final s c t  of ndcrocomp\rtcrs \ - ;MSjj  dri vc 
rcdundant actuators. (A current trend in ultra-safc 
actuator rc~carch i s  not; to usc rcdundant actuators 
but  instcad single actuators with rcdundant hydraulic 
valving systems. Thcua dcviccs opcratc on redundant 
electrical inputs. Scc. for cxanlplc Rcfcrrncc 8 . )  
I t  i s  seen  in this description that information flows fi-on1 
left to right i s  thc figure. Each n~icrocomputcr njorcovcr 
operates recursively in what will be referred to subsequently 
as comp-dtation "frames". In the current experiments, the 
period T of these frames is constant (T = 50 ms. i n  We present 
laboratory version of RAMP.)  (Section V I I I  diecusses this 
aspect of timing in more detail.) As a result, the computation 
process of the system as a whole i s  a combination of parallel 
processing ( e .  g. the microcomputer se t  ( ~ ~ ~ 3  ) and pi peline 
processing (Figure 4). 
A key feature of the RAMP structure as depicted in 
Figure 3 i s  that each microcomputer in the network is designed 
to be autonomous. This autonomy is achieved by: 
1) Letting each microcomputer have i t s  own clock 
such that a s  a whole, the system is not dependent 
upon a central timing reference. 
2) Having each microcomputer employ a set of buffer 
memories that are independently written by other I 
microcomputers in the network. The configuration i 
of these memories and the interconnecting communica- 
tion paths a re  depicted in Figure 5. The essential 
features of this detailed structure arc: 
a) Each microcomputer in the set  [M '3 writes 
lj  I 
data into all rnicrocornputers in the set 1 
1. MiCl, j') . Data. a re  simply "farced" into 
these me~nories during the former ' s  con~putation 
f r a ~ n e .  (I. c .  there is no "handshaking" or 
other coordinating of the data t ransfer  between 
nlicrocomputers. ) 
b) Each microcomputer in  the se t  C ~ i + l , ~  j 
fetches data from the buffer memories  when 
needed during its computation frame. (The 
rncans of avoidkg readlwri te  conflicts is 
discusscd i n  Section VI I I . )  
c )  Electrical isolation (c. g. high in~pcdance  and/or 
optoisolation) i s  cn~ploycd a s  sho\vn bctwccn 
cotnputers . 
The purposc of providing Chis atllonzinly is to prcvcnt 
propagation of hardware fail\ircs in any givcn ~ n i c r a c o ~ n p u t c r  
or  in any given transznissiol~ path to  thc other hardwarc clcmcnts 
i n  thc systcin. As a result ,  for the systcnl of Figurc 3, up to 
onc n~icrocomputcr in each triplet  czn ~ n d c  rgo a Ilar dwparc failure 
without affecting the hardwarc integrity of thc rcnlaining pair 
of microcon~putcrs  in UIC triplet. 
Now thc handling of such fiii1urc.s Itas bccn somcwhat 
vaguely rcfcrrcd to in thr  forrgoing ( c . 6 .  sclcction of "corrt:ct" 
data, "voting", ctc.). This topic is l~owcvcr cezltral to t l ~ c  RAhtP 
concept and discussed at length in the remainder of the paper. 
Before embarking upon this however, it i s  important to note that 
the employment of asynchronous microcomputer modulcs places 
an important constraint on the design of the control laws implc- 
mentcd in RAMP. This is discussed in the next Section. 
I V. FLIGHT CONTROL WITH PARALLEL, ASYNCHRONOUS 
COhPUTERS 
A characterising feature of RAMP is that each micro- 
computer in the network has i t s  own clock. Hence a s  a result 
of variations in (oscillator) components from microcomputer to 
rnicrocomt,.?!tc-r , operation of the system as  a whole is asynchronous. 
It has already been stated that this asynchronism places 
an important constraint on the design of the control laws hosted 
by the network. This is discussed in the following. 
With little sacrifice of generality, consider a set  of 
parallel cornputcrs employed in  the control of a plant a s  
illustrated in Figurc 6. In thc current control law work, aircraft 
control u i s  obtained from thc plant states y using the following 
recurrence equation: 
u ( i t 1 ) T  = A u ( i T ) + B y  ( i t 1 ) T  (4-1) 
where T i s  the pcriod of a computation frarnc (Scc Section III and 
Figure 4). Rcfcrring back to Figurc 6,  i t  will be assumcd that 
only conlputer CI i s  sclcctcd for col~trol of thr plant and that 
i ts  conlputat.;on f r a n ~ c  has pcriod T. Corrcspondingly, it will 
be assurncd that thc remaining computcrs have different and 
\?ncqual computation franlc periods such that only computcr C I 
i s  aclectcd. (Some generality i s  lost here since the select 
process i s  a function of the output of all the computers. What 
fol!.ows therefore i s  a necessary condition for the properties 
of Equation 4- 1). 
Next consider the case in which computer C has a J 
shorter computation frame period by an amount 2 T such that 
after esccution of n computation frames by cornp~~ts r  C I' 
computcr G has csccutcd cxactly (n + 1) computation frames, J 
Loolccd at another way, conll>utcr C J would csccutc exactly 
one nlnrc? conlputt~tion f r a ~ n c  than C cvcry nT scconds. I 
It i s  shown in Appendix A that chic to the timing c r ro r ,  
computcr C \vill grlntbratc rul e r ror  having the following J 
rccurrCnccB relation: 
l l t  1 
,(j -t 1)nT = A (jnT) 
+ A" ( A - I ) u (jnT) i A ~ B ~ ( ~ ~ T )  (4-3)  
It is sho\vn (also i n  Appcndis A) that to g~rarsntcc con- 
vergrncr of this c r ro r ,  i t  i s  ncccssary that thC control law bcing 
cal11putc:d (by all tht? comptitcr s) bc asylnptotically stable. 
(This result can in fact be obtained i n  a more general 
manner by arguing that the outputs of the desclccted computers 
arc uncontrollable auch that to  insure convergence of the e r ror ,  
the control l aw being esccuted must be asymptoticidly stablc.) 
The cffccts of the timing e r ro r  cam bc illustrated by 
considering thc example of Rgurc  7 which depicts a simple 
second order systcnl cmploying a stable, nlctastablc and unstable 
control as shown. The system response (to a unit impufsc) 
i s  the s a c  for each co~ltroller and is shown i n  Figure $a. 
Figurc 8b shows time histories of the e r rors  that would c-xist 
* 
i n  a dcsclcctcd carllputcr having a 1070 timing e r ro r  (i. e .  , 
To gttncralizc thcsc csamplcs, i t  i s  clear that by 
cmploying an unstable or n~ctastablc control algorithm, a 
dcsclectcd nlicrocon~putcr can, as a result of timing crrors alone, 
acc7ir1-iulstc rsccssivc data c r rors  or possibly be sncapacitatcd 
algarithln disc\lsscd bricfly in S%ction U ) ,  the control lavrs a r c  
dcsigncd to be ttsy~nptotically stablc. This &sign policy, which 
* I n  tht- practical application such c r ro r s  arc typically 
tnuch srnallc~r, e .  g .  , . 01% to . 001'5. 
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permits control of data errors due to timing, has an e ~ a l l y  
important role in RAMP 's tolerance to intc rmittent faults 
Before discussing this aspect, the aubject of faults and 
fault tolerance i s  first explored in the following sections. 
- 
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V. FAULT TOLERAIYCE, MASKING AND IDENnF'iCAnON 
In the previous section, the RAMP concept has been 
t f 
illustrated using triplicated computer sets such that each computer 
(with the exception of those interfaced to the scnsor inputs) has 
three buffer memories. 
In terms of the general concept of RAMP (Scction II) 
each computer will have N (= 2n + 1) memorics containing data 
generated from N redundant computers. (In general, more 
than onc redundant sct may input to a given computer in wlrich 
case there \vill be as many mrmorics as thcrc are coniputers. 
This case becoll~cs obviously included in  thc discussion that 
follows. ) 
Each of the N mcnlorics will in turn contain a total of 
K (real number) data values placed thcrc by the corresponding 
transmitting col~lputer. Tllis i s  illustrated in Figure 9 where 
for csamplc D corresponds to the $11 data value in the kth j k 
buffcr memory. 
Now whcrc thcrc! arc no tin.ing errors  (i. e. differing 
clock rates in thc transn~it-ting computers) or faults ( i n  the 
transmitting computers, data transmi ssicm paths, and/or thc 
buffcr nlcmorics), the data in a given row of Figure 9 will be 
identical. However, where timing e r rors  or faults exist, 
these data values can differ. 
The basic approach in RAMP is to use these data in pro- 
viding fault tole rant performance of the s ystem. Before discussing 
the specific strategies employed by RAMP, it is necessary to 
consider the nature of the faults themselves. 
First ,  it is assumed that the faults result from random 
* hardware failures. I. e. , conlmon mode or  "generic" sources 
of failure arising from design rnistakcs, external effects due to 
heating or EMII fabrication mistakes, ctc. have all  bccn accounted 
for in the system design and devclopmcnt process. 
Seco~ld, the faults being considered may be either permanent 
or intermittent (Rcfcrcnce 5). (Intcrn~'?ttcnt faults a r e  a crucial 
issue in the "real world" imnplemcntation of systcms such as 
RAMP and arc discussed in Section VLI.) 
Third, i t  is assunled that the bard.-:are faults experienced 
in a givcn modulc arc confined to t l ~ c  r,>odulc and do not propagate 
(i. e .  the microco~llputcr nlod~iles arc  fully u,ironomous). Note 
that this latter assunlption is rcadily confirmed it1 practice by 
sinlply cnumc rating thc input/output hardware failurc modcs for 
 or thc clcctronic componcnl;~ of thc typc ernp!oycd in micro- 
clcctroluc systcms such as  RAhtP, a constant failurc ratc model 
is employed. Scc for csanlple, Rcfcrcncc 9 .  
each microcotnputcr rnod*.de and verifying that none effects the 
function of the remaining microcomputers in the network. 
Given thcee types of faults, RAMP employs two basic 
methods for realizing fault tolerant performance: 
1) Mid-Value Select 
Due to  variations in the clock ratcs in the individual 
microcomputers the data values corresponding to  the 
rows of Figure 9 will include e r r o r s  due to timing. 
I. e. , the data valucs will be dispersed along the 
real  line a s  shown in the example of Figurc 10. 
Tl~c basic strategy cmployed by all the micro- 
computers i n  RAMP i s  to select, a s  the correc t  
data valuc, thc mid-value of these dispersed operands 
* 
(c.6. D in Figurelo).  More sharply stated, givcn j 2  
the sc t  of N ( = 211 + 1) distinct values (sonic subsets 
of which may bc cqual) in  a given row of Figurc 9 ,  
a valuc will be sclectcd such that thcrc a re  cxactly 
n distinct values grcatcr than or cqual to it and 
exactly n distinct valucs less  than or  equal to it. 
Thc postulate here  i s  that this mid-value will 
approsimatc!, with a known e r r o r ,  thc corrcct  valuc 
8 
Mid-valucs for thc scnsor and command valucs a r e  
scrlcctrd ;is well. 
in  spite of any kind of failure in up to  n of the 
tranemitting microcomputcrr. (A detailcd argument 
behind this i8 reviewed in Appendix B. ) 
The net result i s  that for a given lret of data 
values, only one value i s  selected and 2n a r e  
ignored. I. e . ,  the selection process "marks" the 
results of any failed units and the remainder of the 
"good" units. 
1
Thc fundamental strategy behind RAMP i s  to 
rcly on the known reliability of redundant hardwarc 
to safcly cxccutc flight-critical operations. Spccifically, 
RAMP does not employ any software othcr than the 
mid-valuc sclect to compcnsatc for faults cxpc rienccd 
in flight. 
Faults cxpcricnccd during flight arc however 
identified but for twVo diffcrcnt purposes: 
a) To alert thc flight crcw that failurc(s) has 
occurred. Hcrc, the dccision to continue or 
to abort flight critical operations with the 
degraded system i s  a crew decision. 
b) To provjdc. a f lag  and rccord for syetcm 
maintenance of both permanent and intermittent 
faults experienced t?uring the flight crpcrations. 
The basic approach to in-flight fault identification 
is simple threshold detection which ir described as 
follows . 
Referring back to  Figure 10, it ha8 already been 
noted that Bomc of the data values will be dispersed 
as a result of timing errors in the computer clocks. 
Based on an::ysis and flight test results,  an cxpcctcd 
maximum rangc can bc determined for the dispersion 
of thes c data. Correspondingly, maximum ranges 
can be cstablishcd for cach redundant sensor and 
4: 
rcclunbnt command inputs. During flight, thc actual 
rangc of cach data value is dctcrmincd and compared 
to the corrcsponding , prcdctcrmincd maximum 
rangc. Whcrc thc actual range cxcccds that maxinlum, 
the flight crew and maintcna~~cc! recorder arc  signalled. 
To this point i n  thc discussion, little has bcen 
said about system reliability which is of course thc 
major concern with RAMP Reliability modelling and 
-- - 
* Digital command inputs must of course bc idcntical. 
techniques for dcrivins reliabiliq c8timates are well 
covered in the literahrrc (e.g. Reference8 9 and 10) 
and wil l  not be diacus6cd in thia paper with one 
exception. This is  the fact that to estimate the 
rellabiliw of RAMP for flights of given duration 
(e.g. ten hours maximum) it in neccaaary to 
determine, at the outset of flight, the existence and 
nature of any faults residing in the ryrtcm. 
As a result, the RAMP system must be tested 
prior to flight. This is  discussed in the nex4 
Section. 
VI, RAMP PmFLJGHT TEST 
I t  har bccn pointed out in the ptcviovr section that in 
order to dcrivc valid estimates for the in-flight rc l i~b i l i ty  of 
a given implcmcntation of RAMP, a :.reflight test is required. 
Ideally, one scckrr to dcrign a test that will verify that no 
faults exist. Moreover, thc time required to perform th- tcr t  
must bc short (in the RAMP application thc preflight tcr t  
tirnc should bc undcr ten minutes ). Now i t  i s  wel l  Inown i n  
digital systems practice that thc problem of fully testing LSI 
components of thc type cmploycd in RAMP i s  intractable to the 
extent that the required test timcs have astronomical dimensions. 
Inatcad, onc rcttlcs for t c ~ t i n g  to a givcn " c ~ v t * r a g c " ~  &:finc*d 
as a .:rcc:ntagc of all possiblc faults that can bc uncovered with 
a givcn tcst method. (Scc for cxan~plc Rrfcrcncc 11). 
Bcforc procc-cding wit11 thc &scussion of this r u b j c ~ t  it 
is appropristc to point out t11at thc yrohlcm of designing t e s t s  
to a h o n n  covcragc 2nd more important  prc,ving that such 
covcragc has bccan obtain(-d i s  a t  prcscilt an opten rcscbarch 
question. This a~plicrr not only to R A S P  but in fact  to LS-basc-tl 
systcnls at large. What follo\vs thcrcforc is a b-ficriptiolr of 
the authors' approach to this problem in the context of designing 
and verifying the preflight test for RAMP. 
Before discussing the approach to fault testing, i t  is 
necessary to look more closely a t  the pature of the faults 
themselves. Recalling that the microcomputer modules in  RAMP 
do not propagate their failures, concern is confined to the ways 
a given microcomputer module can fail. 
To do this, a "top-down" or fault t ree (Reference 9 ) 
approach i s  currently being investigated. This approach is 
explained by the following example. 
Consider a single rnicrocomputc r module executing the 
control algorithm given by Equation 6-1. This is illustrated 
in Figure l l a ,  where the control algorithm consists of the 
repetitive execution of the arithmetic replacement statement, 
u = Au + By. (6-1) 
It has already been pointed out that each RAMP module operates 
recursively, inputting data, performing mid-value selection, 
pcrforlning tfireshold detection (to flag inflight e r ro r s ) ,  
executing thc c o ~ ~ t r o l  a gorithm, and outputting results. This 
process i s  illustrated by the program sho\m in Figure 11 b in 
which all thc foregoing functions with the exception of the control 
a l g o r i t h n ~  a r e  prrformc*d by procrdurc (i. c .  s~tbrout inc)  calla. 
The TlhtEOllT pl.ocrdurc is invoked as a part of this codc in  
order to cstabliuh tkt- co~~ip\ i ta t ion franic kmc T (*ction II)* 
Hclrcc?, the prograttl of Figure I l b  is sndcsaly  csccutcd rvcry  
T scconds. 
T o  begin tlw &sc\ission of faults f r o m  a "top-6ww1" 
viewpoint not c fi rs t that thr. ~ n i c r o c o n ~ p \ l t ~ * r  r ~ ~ o d u l c  rscc\rting 
thcx algnrith~n of Figure 11 has just o11t- fai11ir.r mad@: i t  will 
not gcnckrstr* a corrt-ct  y(t) for sanlc II (t). Xt is thc pclsttllatc 
that in IWh4.P ~ ~ i o d u l t * s  this singlc fa i l t i r c  nlotlt. can arise fro111 
or~ ly  th r tv  kincls of faults : 
1) Faults that c c ~ \ ~ s c  data all.rrcttion. 
2 )  k'aults that rc-sult in inll>rnl.r~r c . c . t ~ l i o n  o f t &  
dl-si lyrt.d cotlt. . 
-
3 )  fp.\\llts that cn\iscQ - tlsct*ss i \ v c -  t i  i i i l n ~  c rz-ors. 
Collsidc-ring tlrt- fi vst of thcsl-, i t  is f~~r- t l r l*r  post \ i l ,~t t~d 
111.14 \u~dt\ r 131~- n::s\in~pti c311 tht\t  tilt. c-odc. is b t . i ~ ~ g  rorrvr.t ly 
~ * X C * L . I I ~  t-(1, t]ii- i \ ~ i c - r o < . o ~ ~ ~ ] ) ~ ~ t  t\ r IIIO<\!I~C* <IAtiI C S \ ! ~  bc* . l l t < \ ? ' t - ~ l  ()I\]Y 
as I? r . c - s ~ ~ l t  of nnt8 01- r i r c l  r-t .  of thth fc)llo\vil~p.: 
3) Fitt11t.s ill fht* p; t l l ~ ( : ; )  ~ . o ~ ~ n t \ c t i ~ \ p ,  f f ~ c *  ir~ptit di~ta 
y(t) 1 o tht* CI'U (i.  c* . ak .c \ i~~n~la tor )  
b) Faults in the path(s) connecting thc CPU (i. c. 
accumuiator) to tllc output of the module. 
c )  Faults in the constant data (c.g. A and B 
i n  Figurc 11) store.  
d) Faults in the rcad/writc data ( c .  g. u ) tenlporary 
store.  
e )  Faults in the CPU that correct ly  evaluate 
aritlunctic and/or logical cspressions for  some 
operand pa i r s  but not others.  In the example 
a t  hand ;uch faults would include thosc that give 
invalid results f o ~  u for some values of y but 
not othc r s . 
Next, in consi dc ring imp  .ope r program execution, wc f i r s t  
note that i n  RAMP thc instructions a r e  fiscd, i. c. cach nlodule 
i s  prcprogrammc?d to rcpctitivr-ly cscc\rtc a prcdctcr~l l ined,  cxact 
scqticncc of instructions. Thc instructions nloreovcl- fall into 
two catcgorics: 
a )  Thost. that a r c  data-sc.nsiti\-c , I. c. the path taken 
in t l ~ c  program flow is dctc-rrnillcd by thr  data being 
y roccssc-d. (Data-scnsitivc instructions arc- illus tratcd 
in Figurc l l c . )  
b) Thoso that arc- data-inscnsit:ivt. ( c . 6 .  tllc proccdurc 
CALLS, and JUMP TO TOP instructions in  
Figurc Ilb). 
Corrcspondingly, improper program cxccution can bc 
t raced  to: 
a )  Faults in the CP U that correct ly  execute data- sensitive 
instructions for sonlc data values but not others. 
b) Faults in  machinc code store, instruction counters, 
address  decoders, rcad/writc stack, ctc, 
Finally, cxccssivc timing e r r o r s  can be t r aced  to faults 
in the timing rcfcrencc (c. g. crystal) ,  oscillator amplifier 
failures, ctc. 
The discussion of the csamplc i s  s u m n ~ a r i z c d  in Figure 12 
wltich the authors postulate cmhraccs all the possible ways a 
RAMP n1odu.l c can fail. 
The objective of the preflight t c s t  thcrcforc is to  tes t  for 
the faults dcpictcd a t  t l~c  base of the Figurc. Since thc preflight 
tcs t  i s  initiated immcdiatcly after systcln s tar t -up (Section VIII ) ,  the 
sq*stcln wil l  iriitially "appcar" syxlcllronizcd. (For  csnl l~plc ,  
if tllr clock f rc quc\ncics of all t l ~ c  n1icrocol17putcr s a r c  \vitllin 
a rcnctily nchic:vable .0017; of onc another, a systcln wit11 a 5 0 . m ~  
conlpt~tat-ion f r;u-uc rate will "apprar " to bc synchroilizc d for 
s o n ~ c  80 n1inuf.c~ d t c r  systcln stnl.tup.) Hrllcc, thc prcflight 
tcs t  will bc carr ied  out during this period of apparcnt 
synchronization. 
I n  the current work- .;IC plan is to  ca r ry  out the preflight 
tcst for each lnodulc in two steps: 
1) A self-tcst of each module would be initially performed 
to: 
a)  test  the CPU for faults associated with 
cvalt~ation of aritlunctic and logical operations 
and tllc testing for  faults in  data sensitive 
instructions. 
b) tcs t  the rcad/\vritc store.  
This tcs t  wottld bc carr icd  out concurrently by all thc 
microcompute rs . 
2) An input/output tcst .  To pcrform this tcst, the 
RAMP structurc would be s~~pplemcntcd  with two 
micracomyutc r niod~rles, onc that inputs tcst  patttbrns 
t o  the sensor /con~mand ~~ucrocomputc  r s and a sccond 
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to nlollitc,:. outyuts of tl~llt- s c rvo microc ol~lpute r s . 
referring back to the basic structurr  of RAMP as  
dcpictcd in Figurc 3 ,  the nct\\ro:.k s tructure undcr 
t c s t  ~vould have oach sc.t of redundant r n i c r o c o n ~ p ~ ~ t c  r s  
$; 
This 1at-t~- r con~ptlf;cr woul d also bc cn-rp1oyc.d for in-flight 
fault idllt!ntification. 
receiving tcst  inputs from at lcast one microcomputer 
and each set  would likewise be n~onitorcd by at lcast 
one mic rocotnputc r . In executing the input /output 
tcst, each ~~~ ic rocompu te r  in a redundant se t  would 
accordingly: 
a) Generate chcckwords signalling success or 
failure of the sclf-test. 
b) Rcceivc and verify input test  p a t t c ~ n s  validating 
data input paths. 
c )  Transnxit all the contents of its constant store. 
d) Reccivt. a seqncncc of data inputs that tcst all 
paths in  the instruction code and transnlit the 
results to a monitoring c o n ~ p ~ b c r  (i. c. to the 
next set  of redundant compute L-s or  the micro- 
computer monitoring tllc st% rvo microcomputers' 
outputs). 
e )  Transnut i ts  value of timc. 
f )  Transinit tcst pattcrns to check thc downstrcaln 
computc r s inputs. 
g )  Gcncratc data patterns that \vill cxercisc all 
the instruction paths in the do\vtls t ream 
computc rs. 
ciuring this tcst ,  cach ~~l ic rocon~putc r  monitoring a 
redundant set must rcccivc identical data f r o m  each 
nlicroconlputcr i n  that set. Success of the preflight 
tcst  is accordingly a c l ~ c v e d  by a "bit-by-bit" match 
of thcsc data for  thc full duration of thc test .  
Returning to t l ~ c  subject of covcragc, the foregoing tes t  
covers all the faults dcpicted in Figurc 12. Givcn the validity 
of the pos tdate  that thesc rcprcscnt all possiblc faults,  the 
actual covcragc that can bc attained by this tcsting proccdurc i s  
gove rnc d by: 
1) Thc covclragc that a n  bc achieved in the  CPU and 
rcad/wri te storc! self-tests. 
2) The pcobability s f  conlpcnsating faults, c .  g. a 
failed C P U  test routine that signals a "success" 
chcck\vord. 
The foregoing yrcfligl~t tcs t  approach is currently bcing 
invcstigatc d with the current laboratory version of RAMP 
(Section W). llc~sults ~vi l l  bc presented in tllc futurc. 
VTI. INTERMsTTENT FAULT TOLERANCE 
In Section V it was noted that faults can be classified 
as being either permanent or intermittent. 
Of these two types of faults, the permanent faults are  
best understood: the bulk of the available electronic component 
failure rate data and failure mechanism models a re  based an 
permanent faults, they arc  more readily uncovered by testing, 
and thcir effects on system pcrformancc easily determined. 
Ii~tcrnlittcnt faults on the other hand a re  less un&rstood yet 
in thc'lkeal worldtlapplication account for the majority of failures 
in  computer systcms (some 80% to 90% as  estimated in Reference12 ). 
For the purposes of the discussion that follows, these 
intermittent faults can bc inclusively classified as being eithcr 
permanent or transient. In the context of the microcomputer 
systcms of thc type that would be cn>ploycd in JUMP such 
pcrn~anent faults a rc  tliosc in which an intermittent fault has 
altered normal program flow to thc extent that the rnicrocomputcr 
cntcrs an infinite loop, enters a halt state, ctc. I. 'c. , tllc micro- 
conlputer system i s  "crasltcd". With the transient faults however, 
normal program flow is rcsumcd after disappcarancc of thc 
intermittent fault but usually wit11 the consequence that the data 
being proccs sed have bccn alte red. Thcsc two consequences 
of intermittent faults arc  depicted in Figure 13 which also shows 
how these relate to  the faults ciiscusued in the prcvioue Section. 
Note in thc figure that intermittent timing faults result 
in transient system faults. This particular type of fault has 
bccn inclircctly discussed in Section IV ,  i. c . ,  by virtue of 
use of an asymptotically stable c o ~ ~ t r o l  law, the e r ro r s  introduccd 
by an intermittent tinling fault will, in t in~c ,  convcrgc to zero. 
Now i t  should bc clear from Figure 13 that this will also be the 
case for all the other intermittent faults that produce transient 
system faults. I. c .  the RAMP microcon~puter module is 
inherently iault tolerant to thcsc types of intermittcnt faults. 
Permanent systcm faults, i. c. , those resulting from 
bl-okcn p q r a m  flow, can bc accomnlodatcd by thc sinlplc 
* 
expcdicnt of using cxtcrnd hardware to dctcct a loss in program 
flow and force the ~nicrocon~putcr  into a rcstart  or re t ry  
(Rcfrrcncr 12) oycration. This can be done in a (probably 
el~dless)  variety of ways. Hcncc , the follo\ving describes onc 
such approach mainly to illustrate the silnplicity and cffcctivcncss 
of thc basic idca. 
" As will br scrn,  such cx-trrnal hardware i s  already availa1,lc 
in cur rent nlicrocomputcr components. 
First, natc that to initiate operation of a microcomputer, 
the device i s  normally supplied with an cxtcrnal reset  signal 
(or pulse) that results in the s ta r t  of the computer program a t  
some predesignated location (i. e. address). Since each RAMP 
module will be expected to perform different functions (e.g. the 
prcflight tcst,  processing of the flight algorithm, etc.)  the 
module will receive (i.c. have deposited in buffer memory) 
not only data, but a command word that when fetched will 
indicate the specific function the module should be performing 
at that time. Hence, to s tar t  system operation, a Mh4P modulc 
will be given a hardwarc reset and i t s  program will "look" at  
the colnn~and word (wllich fcllowing the prcvious section, will 
signal the modulc to begin the preflight test\. At thc completion 
of the prcflight tcst,  the microcomputer n~odulc would receive a 
diffcrcnt co~nmand word to signal s tar t  of processing of t he  control 
algorithm. 
Given this, a retry or restart  duc to broken program flow 
can be achieved using the hardware structure shown i n  Figurc 14a. 
The idea Ilerc i s  to supplcrncnt the prograni cnlploycd in the 
WLMP module with output instructions such that undcr nornlal 
prograln flow, a pulse i s  output during cach computation frame. 
1.e. in the unfdlcd condition, the microcamputcr will generate 
a pulse train of pcriod equal to thc computation frame pcriod 
T1. Each of these pulses in  turn will retrigger a monostablc 
multivibrator a s  shown in  the figure. As long as this pulsc 
train is maintained, the multivibrator will output a constant 
level (OFF) as shown in Figurc 14b. In thc event of broken 
program flow, it can bc expected that this pulsc train will ccase. 
Now thc monostablc multivibrator is adjusted such that a t  a time 
T2 (TZ 7 TI) after the last pulse (Figurc 14b) i t s  output level 
shifts (ON) as shown. This output in turn is trsed to gate an 
astable multivibrator ( F i ~ u r c  14a) \vhiclr in this gated condition 
generates a train of pulses having period T 3 ()TI) as  shown in  
F'igure 14b. Thc function of each of these pulses is to reset thc 
microcomputer such that i t  begins procrssing at thc  reset addrcss, 
fetches the command word and recognizing that it should bc 
cxecut i~~g the control algoritl~m bcgins processing thc algorithnl 
from some predcsignatcd initial state ( e . g  U = 0 in Equation 6-1). 
Successful resunlption of colnputation rcstorcs tllc pulsc train 
driving thc ~ ~ o s t a b l c  multivibrator causing its output to return 
to the OFF level. Thc astable multitibrator in turn is gated off 
as shown. 
Finally, it can be cxpected that the algorithm will initially 
be computing incorrect atatcr following the retry. Howcver, 
based on it8 convergence properticr, it will, in time, reach the 
* 
correct state, Hence, the above reret circuitry plus thc 
convergence propcrtier of the control law provide a RAMP 
module with the inherent high tolerance to intermittent faulta 
enjoyed by most analog systems. 
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I . c . ,  as a result of the interx-nitttc.clt failure thc module will 
bc dcsclcctcd and hcncc bc running "opc-n" loop. 
VW. LABORATORY IMPLEMENTATION OF RAMP 
In  order  to verify its underlying concepto, RAMP has 
been implemented i n  the laboratory a r  shown i n  Figure 15. 
Here, as shown a p d  r of redundant rnicrocomputcr triplets 
are used to gencratc trajectory commands and provide t r a -  
jectory and attitude control of a rotorcraf t  plant mechanized 
on an analog computcr. (Only the pitch plane has bccn 
mcchanizcd in  the laboratory; a full, s ix  axis vcrsian of U h f P  
i a  currently undcr dcvclopnlcnt.) 
Tlrc basic rnicrocomputcr module employcd in  the 
laboratory is shown in Figurc 16 along with its basic rpccifications. 
This structure was sclcctcd by thc authors as hcirrg rcprcscntativc 
m 
of what i n  thc 1985-1990 dcsign ycri  od may bo availablc on a 
* 
single chip o r ,  at mos t ,  a three chip family (e .&  scc  Rcfcrcnce 16). 
Each of thc n~odulcs  a r c  in~l~lcn-rentcd on a ringlc card,  the six 
modules intcrcolln<:ctcd on a wvircd backplane. 
In  thc laboratory, the basic snicrocomputcr n~odule of 
Figurc 16 i s  cmploycd as a sensor nlicroconlputcr (the f irs t  sc t  
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Tht- laboratory vcrsion ctllploys a 16-bit archi tccturu with 
NhlOS technology. Future, single chip vcrsionr may bc 
available i n  32-bit archilcctures with fastcr ( c .  y .  SOS) 
tcchnology. Sqc RL-fcrcrrcc 13 . 
of triplctr  in Figure 15) and a rcrvo  computcr (the second ac t  
of triplcts). Thc r t ructurc of thcac modulea is depicted in 
Figure 17 and their operation cxplair~cd as followa: 
1) Each of thc thrcc rensor modules (Figurc 17it) 
8eIcct.s (analog) outputrr from tht? rubweraft  plant 
and convcrtr t l ~ c s c  to digital rcprcscntation. 
(Non-redundant rensor  inputs havc bcrn us rd  to 
datc, ) Thc colnputcr then grneratcr  t ra jectory 
con~n~andq  (tarrgc and vr*Iocity) and cxccutcs a 
trajcctory control alporj tllnl based on the cr t o r s  
bct\\*ccn t h c ~ c  commands and thc actual a i r c ra f t  
states. The outputs of thc trajcclory control 
algorithnl art* attjtudc control cornrnandis which, 
along with thc mci~ri\rrcd attitudc control stactas 
(pitch attitutlt. and pitch ratc) arc  writlr11 to the 
bufic-r n lcn ior i t*~  o f  th<- scnrvo n-.c~tl\llc-s . (1b.fcr 
al:ajn to Fii:\rrc 3 for tlrc s t r \ i c t ~ ~ r ~ b  of 0 . 6 .  intc-r- 
connect brt\\,t*cn ~rodulc*s transnlitting and rc*cc.i\+nl: 
bufft8rt.d clatct.) In addition to thost* co:~.rn;;snd arlci 
data values, a "data ready" s ignal  is tranr;n:ittc*d 
that the memory has been written. The purpose 
of this signal is to circumvent the conflict of the 
receiving microcomputer trying to read a memory 
simultaneously being written by a transmitting 
compute r . 
2 1 Each servo computer in turn reads the contents 
~ 3 '  { t s  buffer memories, performs the midvalue 
se:ect, threshold detection, executes the attitude 
control algorithm, and generates an analog control 
(Figure 17b). Control outputs feed a model of a 
"fly-by-wire'' actuator (Figure 15 ) which in turn 
outputs a single control to the aircraft plant. 
The above implementation of RAMP has verified that the 
basic concepts behind RAMP can be realized in  practice 
specifically: 
1 ) Minimum Complexity Re ali zation 
One guage of complexity in a fault-tolerant 
computational system i s  the amount of "overhead" 
that i s  required to provide fault tolerance. In terms 
of computational resources, one is concerned principally 
with the demands on available program memory and 
execution time. Figure18 shows the fractions of 
prograxu xnenlory and csecut iol~ t ime that  constitutc 
thc ovcrhcad of thc cur rcx~t  laboratory vcrpion of 
RAMP as would be applicd i n  the six-degree-of- 
freedom application. (In thc f igure  "FAULT" 
r c fe r s  to  the n~idvaluc-select ,  threshold-dctcct 
code,  "COMM" to the codc for writing, and rcading 
buffer n l c n ~ o r i e s ,  "OTHER" referr ing to the modtlles 
mainline program,  initialization procedures, etc.  
"AVAILABLE" rc fc rs  to that portion of the resource 
which can be used for thc x~lodulcs intcndcd 
application. ) 
Not'? Chat thv prc-flight t es t  is not: includcd 
i n  thc figttrc (thc cur rcn t  version being cvaluatcd 
cmpl oys appr osimalcly .5K of y rogralrl nlclnory 
and rc*qui r c s  approsinlatcly 4 13inutcs to esccutc). 
2) _As y n c l ~ r o n i s ~  
Clock ra tcs  car1 and hnvt- \wen varic-d in  thc 
laboratory to tlcl~rnlzstrntc the convcrgcncc propcartics 
of t l ~ c  asymptotically stablc colltrol a1l:orithms. 
3 )  Mi d - V i \ l \ l ~  St11 c_c:t ; ' l ' l l r c .? : l~n~ Dctccti OJI- 
Thc mid-vn111c. sclcct  strati.gy has, to datc-, 
bccn clnpl ayctl in  the laboratory siniul alions \%-it21 
no cffcctti on system stability or accuracy. The 
covaragc of thc thresl~old dc*trction process i s  still 
under investigation and will bc rcportcd in thc 
future. 
4) Intcrmittcnt Fault Tolc rancc? 
The! rcscrt circuit. method described in Scction VII 
has been ilnplrmentrd and tcstrd succcssfirlly in the 
laboratory. 
I X .  CONCL*USION 
As explained ear l ie r ,  tho RAMP i s  largeted to the 
VLSZ nlicroco; .~~p~ttcr  components that a r c  projected to bc 
co~lunerci  ally avd la l lo  in the late 1980's. I. e. , implenlcntation 
of RAMP using present-day comnponcnts is not practical chiefly 
due to thc large volumcs rcquircd for packaging. Correspondingly , 
thc reliability lcvels tllet can bc ac!.!vq\. ..C by RAMP will dcpcnd 
upon thc rcliabilitics of thcsc future componcnts. LSI semi-  
conductor failure ratcs  (on a per-gate basis) have continued 
to dccreasc \\it& inlprc)vcrncnts in screening and processing 
tcchmology. It is thc industry's goal to conti~lue this trend, 
in  the face of tile ncw and forccful challcngcs which V L S  
technology \\ill present (Rcfcrcncc 14). Hrncc, the viability 
of lUMP as a nlcans ol  rcdixing ultra rrliaMe aviorlics 
systcllls hinges on thcsc* futurc dcvc-liq>rncnts. 
Thc conccpts underlying W E  in parkictltar the use of 
autonomous, as y~lchronous , intcx.i.rJ ttcnt -fault: tolerant rnodt~les 
for control has broad, inlnlcdiatc application. Corrclspondingly, 

APPENDIX A - EFFECT OF I lh4lNG ERRORS IN PARALLEL 
ASYNCHRONOUS FLJCiIIT CONTROL COMX'UTERS 
As described in  tllc main body of the t e s t ,  i t  is the 
functiox~ of each microcomp\iter in the RAMP s t ruc ture  to 
mid-value select  operands f rom the ups t rcam sc t  of redundant 
computers.  To simplify the discussion of the effects of 
asynchronism collsidcr thc case of two paral le l  computers 
MS and M cnlployycd in a control configuration as shown in 
Figurc Al. As seen i n  the figure,  M i s  thc computer S 
selectcd for thc control ,  i .  e .  , i s  operating i n  the closed loop. 
Cor.~puter MU i s  c ~ c s e l r c t ~ ~ d  an  is hence operating open loop. 
As also csplaincd e a r l i e r ,  e a c h  of a given se t  of parallel  
cc~inputcrs in  the RAMP structure  has n cachr* memor ies  
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such that the nth cachc memory i n  e ach  c o n ~ p t ~ t e r  in thc s e t  
i s  sinl~ilt,zncot!sly \\.rittcn by thc nth upstrcatn computer .  
Tliis proccss  is r cprcsc~ntcd in Figure Al by a samplc -and - 
hold function a s  shown (i. c - .  , only thc sclcctcd upstream 
c o l n p u t ~ ~ r  is di.pictcd).  Colnputcrs M D  and r\IS i n  turn sample 
tllc hr3ld vs l~ l c s  as  sho\vl~. Tllis sn~npl ing proccss  i s  depicted 
in Figurc A2 \vhr r r i n  tht* samplings by  M,, and MS a r c  shown 
by inrpulsc hmctions i ( 1 )  and iS(t). For  the devc.lopmrnt that 13 
follo\vs, i t  i s  assumed that the sclcctcd computer M salnples S 
a t  the same ratc that y(t) is sampled with each sample taken 
at a time immcdiatcly following the sampling of y(t). Conlputctr 
MD samples a t  a higher ratc a s  shown such that a t  t imes i T  
and ( i  + n)T computers MS and MD s imul tane~us ly  sample 
thc input. Brtwccn these t imes ,  computer M samples a n  D 
input value i ~ n ~ ~ l c d i a t e l y  preceeding that sampled by M S' Note 
that in  the period nT ,  computer M takes esactly one more 
I) 
sample (and hcncc one addi t ion~l  computation) than MS. 
Now both computers will esec\ttc the same control law 
given by the follo\~ing recurrence equation: 
I n  \\that: follows i t  is  shown that Equation (Al) must bc 
s t  abl c in or c1t.r that thc dcsclcct cd colnputcr not accunl~llate 
wacccpt  abl c c r r o r s  due to  i t s  asyl~chrold sm. Stabi lity of 
Equation ( A l )  i s  however not requi red  for s t ab i l i t y  of tho 
closcd loop system.  The: esi stencc and for111 of the c r r o r  is 
arr ived at  induct ivcly in the follo\\-ing. 
At time i T ,  let  the scl  cc tcd  and desc l  c c t c d  colnputcrs 
r c s l~cc t ivc l  y conlput c control valucs uS(iT) and uD(iT). 
h.lorco\ver, assume that the* dcscl cct  c d  corllput cr has an c r r o r  
u G (iT) due to the asynchroni s m  such that, 
uD(iT) = uS(iT) + u (iT) 
Now comput c 
a s  follows. 
First, note that in  solving Equation (Al), 
nii- 1 
u S pi + n)T] = A " U ~ ( ~ T )  + C A ~ ~ ' ~ -  ' By k w l ) T ]  (As) 
k = i  
Through study of Figure (AD it can be seen that 
n t l  
u D Gi + n ) d =  A uD(iT) + nnFJy(i~)  
nti- 1 
nti-k-lBy @ + i ) ~ ]  + 22 A (A41 
From (A2), 
u D (iT) = u S (iT) + u ( Z  ( iT)  
Substituting this into Equation (A4) and subtracting 
Equation (A3) thc e r r o r  a t  time (i + n)T i s  obtained: 
n t l  
u & b i t n ) T l  = A u (iT) + A ~ ( A - I ) u  S (iT) 
+ A ~ B ~ ( ~ T )  (A5 
Thc nssunlption that uC (iT) is - an e r r o r  due Lo asynchroni s m  
- i; 
i s  cor rec t  s i ~ l c c  a t  t = 0. uG (O),\(i.c. , thr f irst  samplc is 
tskcn six~~ultnnr.ously by thc computers) and at timc t = T,  

Correspondingly, 
Hence, the rate  of convergence of the asynchroniam 
e r r o r  introduced into the deselected computer is the same 
a s  that of the control law being computed. -
F'inally, looking at the las t  two te rms on the right of 
Equation (A6), the magnitude of the e r r o r  i n  the deselected 
computer can be reduced by one o r  both of the following: 
1) Increasing the ra te  of convergence in  the control 
law. 
2) Increasing n(i. e. reducing the timing e r ro r ) .  
APPENIXX B - MID-VALUE SELECT FOR FAULT MASKING 
Section V desc ribed the strategy of sclecting the mid-value 
of a se t  of N = (2n t 1) data valucs as  a means of masking 
faults in the RAMP network. The following paragraph8 
explain in grcatcr  detail the justification fo r  this approach. 
Recall that the effcct of the timing e r r o r s  in the s e t  of 
N computers is to  disperse the data values over somc range 
2 k about that valuc which would bc obtained with no timing 
e r r o r .  This i s  i l lustratcd in  Figure Bl in which each of the 
N values a r e  classified a s  bcing cor rec t  o r  incnrrcct a s  follows. 
A corrcc t  valuc l ies  within f & of the value that would be 
obtained 16th no timing c r r o r ;  all other valucs arc incorrect.  
Givcn no faults ( i . e .  tinling c r r o r  only) all valucs would be 
cor rcc t .  On the other hand a data valuc gcncratcd by a 
faultcd cot~lpulcr could be in gencral cithcr cor rcc t  or incorrect.  
It can nowv be argucd that given up to  n failures in the N 
co~npu tc r s ,  thc mid-valuv will al\vays bc corrcct :  If thc mid- 
va l~ ic  originatcd froltl a non-failed computc r ,  it: is  obviously 
cor rec t .  If on the other hand i t  origjnatcd from a faulted 
computcr i t  \\..ill still 1,c co r rcc t .  Thc reason for  this i s  that 
the mid-valtic by definition has esactly n distinct valucs grcatcr  
than or  equal to it  and exactly n distinct values less  than or 
equal to i t .  Hence, i f  the mid-value is  gencratcd from a 
faulted cotnputer there must remain up to n - 1 values 
originating f ram faulted computers. The mid-value must 
accordingly lie bct\ttecn two correct v ~ l u c s  and therefore be 
correct. 
This argumcnt also shows why N must bc odd since in 
1Cr 
using an eve11 numbcr N = 2n of computcrs only (n - 1) 
failures can be 'iolcratcd, thc same condition that would 
corrcspond to use of an odd numbcr, N - 1 of cornputcrs. 
I. c. , the use of an cven number of coinputere is uncconon~ic. 
- 
1: 
Giv1.n an c.vcBtl nttmbcr of co~r~putcrs  thcbrc is of courscb no 
i -  . OII~' \t.c,:;ld instt.ad st-Joct tho tnc.dian vrrluc- of 
lht. tn.0  in:^.. r~most  vn1uc.s on thc 1-t.al l int . .  
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